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A B S T R A C T   
This paper examines the relationship between common owners and firm dividend policy. We find 
that dividend policies of firms newly added to an investor’s portfolio evolve towards the dividend 
policies of the existing firms in this portfolio. This relationship is neither driven by owners tar-
geting firms forecasted to change their dividend policies, nor by firms with a similar dividend 
strategy to the companies in the new investor’s existing portfolio. Our results suggest that owners 
have a dividend policy style, and that their influence depends on the type of co-owner and the 
existing governance characteristics of the co-purchased firm.   
1. Introduction 
Common owners are shareholders having stocks of multiple companies. Their existence affects firm outcomes (Edmans et al., 2019) 
such as management incentives (Anton et al., 2016), product markets (Azar et al., 2018, 2016; He and Huang, 2017), technological 
process and innovation (Geng et al., 2016; Kostovetsky and Manconi, 2016), disclosure policy (Jung, 2013), supply chain management 
(Freeman, 2016), firm’s equity and debt markets (Anton and Polk, 2014; Cici et al., 2015), or shareholders proposals (He et al., 2018). 
However, little is known about the influence of common owners on corporate financial decisions. Evidence of common ownership 
effect on corporate finance is limited to mergers and acquisitions activity (Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008; Harford et al., 2011; Brooks 
et al., 2016), capital structure and cash management (Semov, 2017). 
In this paper we investigate the role of common ownership on a firm’s dividend policy. This policy has strong effects on firm 
outcomes and is deeply affected by its shareholders’ characteristics (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000; Pindado et al., 2012; Sekerci, 
2020; Crane et al., 2016; Gaspar et al., 2012). 
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The literature above suggests that common owners promote similarities in corporate strategies (e.g., product, technological, 
innovation and other processes) of the firms in their portfolios. Therefore, it is natural to wonder if common owners do so in the 
dividend choices as well. Following Edmans et al. (2019), this paper focuses on influential common owners as their incentives to affect 
firm decisions are greater. 
Accordingly, we conjecture a positive relationship between dividend yield of the co-owner’s existing portfolio and that of the firm 
she adds to her portfolio. Specifically, we ask 1) Do common owners apply a similar dividend strategy in the firms they co-own (i.e., do 
they have a “dividend style”?); 2) Does this style vary with co-owners type, ownership, portfolio characteristics, or expertise?; 3) Does 
this style vary according to the governance settings of the newly purchased firm (e.g., existing ownership structure, main owner’s 
identity)? 
We use detailed ownership data from Sweden. The Swedish setting offers us two main advantages to study common owners. First, 
as we focus on influential common owners, we study the top five owners of firms. In Sweden, these top five owners are represented in 
nomination committees and can appoint board members (Dent, 2013). Therefore, they have strong incentives to enhance governance 
and influence the corporate policies of the firm. Second, Swedish data provides detailed information on ownership by its type (e.g., 
institutional investors, family owners).2 This separation is important as not only institutional investors but also family owners are 
influential across Continental Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002). The Swedish ownership data we exploit have been previously used in 
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), Giannetti and Simonov (2006), and Ravid and Sekerci (2020). The advantage of the Swedish setting is 
particularly underlined by Giannetti and Simonov (2006) and summarized in the following sentence: “The Swedish stock market offers 
a unique context in which to analyze issues related to investor behavior and corporate governance, and allows conclusions to be drawn, 
which go well beyond the Swedish market” (Giannetti and Simonov, 2006, page 1511). Given the similar level of ownership con-
centration, our results could be useful not only for Continental Europe (e.g., Boubaker et al., 2016; Maury and Pajuste, 2005), but also 
Far East countries (e.g., Attig et al., 2009). 
We find a positive and significant relationship between the dividend yield in the new and in the existing firms of a co-owner’s 
portfolio. This co-owner’s style in dividend policy is significant mainly when the co-owner is a financial firm, has sector expertise and a 
large portfolio of firms associated with highagency conflicts. We provide evidence suggesting that stock selection is not driving the 
“dividend style” results as institutional investors do not target firms whose dividend policy is similar to those of existing firms in their 
portfolio. 
The paper has several contributions. First, it provides evidence on the relationship between common ownership and corporate 
dividend policy. Second, it is the first study to show evidence on common ownership from Continental Europe. Third, it examines the 
role of all influential common owners including family common owners. Past literature focuses only institutional common owners who 
tend to hold less than 1% of the firm shares (e.g., He et al., 2018). Fourth, in contrast to prior studies that concentrate on the existing 
portfolios of co-owners, we assess their portfolio formation considerations. 
2. Data 
Our sample covers the period 2000–2014 and includes 193 firms (excluding banks and insurance companies) that are listed on the 
Nasdaq-OMX stock exchange in Stockholm and domiciled in Sweden. We obtain accounting and firm characteristics data from 
Datastream and annual reports. Ownership data are collected manually from the ownership database called Modular Finance AB (SIS 
Ägarservice AB previously) and also used in Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), Giannetti and Simonov (2006), and Ravid and Sekerci 
(2020). 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Table 1 presents the data. We highlight that the largest owner, on average, holds 
a substantial fraction (22.8%) of firm shares, and the third owner, on average, is a blockholder (i.e., an owner who has at least 5% of a 
firm’s shares) (Table 1, Panel A). The majority of co-purchasers are financial institutions, and they buy a smaller fraction of firm shares 
compared to familyco-purchasers (Table 1, Panel B). We also show that co-purchased firms are similar to the other firms (Table 1, 
Panel C). 
3. Empirical design 
In the main analysis, we examine whether dividend policy in a newly co-purchased firm is similar to the dividend policies in the 
other firms in a co-owner’s existing portfolio. Specifically, we examine the relationship between dividends in a newly co-purchased 
firm and the average dividends of the other firms in a co-owner’s portfolio using the OLS methodology. Our empirical strategy ex-
ploits the portfolio composition of multiple owners for a single firm per year. We run the following model at a co-purchase level: 
Divi,t+1 = α + βPortDivi,t− 1 + δXi,t + λZi,t + εi,t+1 (1)  
where Divit + 1 (named FDIV in tables) is the firm-year level dividends in firm i in year t + 1, PortDivi,t − 1 is the value-weighted average 
dividends in the portfolio of firms owned in year t-1 by the co-purchaser of a firm i. X is an ownership-related control. Z controls for a 
set of firm characteristics. We add year and sector fixed effects. εit + 1 is the error term clustered at owner-level. Following Crane et al. 
(2016), Lasfer et al. (2020), Becker et al. (2011), and Graham and Kumar (2006) among the others, we measure our dependent 
2 We use “institutional investors” and “financial owners” interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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variable, dividends, as dividend yield (in percentage), which is dividend paid per share as a percentage of the share price. In Eq. (1), 
our coefficient of interest is β. A positive and significant coefficient implies a positive relationship between the dividend policy of the 
new firm and those of the firms in the co-owner’s existing portfolio. 
4. Results 
4.1. Co-purchasers and dividend policy 
The positive and significant coefficient on PortDIV of Table 2 suggests that firms whose shares are bought by co-owners have similar 
levels of dividend yield in the year after the co-purchase. A co-purchaser with a one percentage point higher average portfolio dividend 
yield raises dividend yield by 0.1% point in the newly-invested firm (Table 2, Column 1). The effect is larger in firms co-purchased by 
owners with high dividend-paying stocks in their portfolios (Table 2, Column 2).3 
Next, we investigate whether the number of shares the co-purchaser buys in the new firm might affect the future firm dividends. We 
interact the PortDIVHigh variable with the amount of shares purchased. The cross-sectional variation in ownership does not seem to 
affect shareholders’ influence on firms’ future dividends (Table 2, Column 3). This finding can be explained by the fact that in Sweden, 
the largest five owners typically have representatives on nomination committees, which nominate the firm’s board members. 
Therefore, these top five shareholders play similarly important roles in the governance and corporate financial decisions of the firm, 
regardless of how many shares they own. 
Our results are robust to clustering errors at firm level (Table 2, Column 4), controlling for firm governance characteristics - the 
number of directors and the fraction of independent directors (Table 2, Column 5), using the ratio of dividends to net earnings as in 
Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) as a proxy for firm dividends (Table 2, Column 6). Overall, the findings from Table 2 are consistent with 
the premise that co-owners tend to implement similar strategies across the companies they own.4 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics.  
Panel A. Sample overview 
% shares by owner: mean stdev min max     
1 22.8 14.9 0.2 72.8     
2 9.3 6.2 0.1 38.8     
3 5.8 3.4 0.1 24.4     
4 4.3 2.4 0.1 15.9     
5 3.3 2.1 0 15.7     
TOP 5 45.8 17.5 0 91     
Panel B. Holdings of co-owners          
Frequency Shares       
Family 82 8.87       
Financial 842 4.31       
Others 18 5.1       
Observations: 942         
Panel C. Firm characteristics          
Co-purchased Non-copurchased    
Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Difference T-stat 
ASSETS 12.33 35.62 1139 13.21 38.10 849 − 0.88 − 0.53 
ROA,% 0.68 18.92 1135 0.28 20.18 848 0.40 0.44 
RD,% 3.07 7.86 1135 3.92 9.41 848 − 0.85 − 2.18 
CAPEX,% 3.67 4.56 1125 3.88 4.88 840 − 0.21 − 0.99 
LEV,% 49.65 19.56 1135 50.57 20.01 848 − 0.92 − 1.02 
MB 2.95 3.53 1126 3.08 3.41 834 − 0.13 − 0.81 
DIV,% 2.26 2.29 1127 2.19 2.29 834 0.07 0.64 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A presents the summary statistics of the firm shares held by the top five owners. The 
first column orders the top five owners. Accordingly, the second column presents the average firm’s shares held by these top five owners, respectively. 
The last three columns present the standard deviations, minimum and maximum values of shares held by these top five owners. 
Panel B reports summary statistics of holdings of co-owners. The first column shows the number of observations of co-owners for each respective 
identity category. The second column shows the shares held by co-owners that belong to the different identity groups. The last two columns show the 
mean difference tests between the average values of votes and shares. 
Panel C presents summary statistics of the characteristics of firms that are co-purchased and not co-purchased. All the variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
3 Results are robust to replacing the level values of dividend yield with the first difference of dividend yield.  
4 Following the literature, we also studied stock repurchases and ran our main regression by using the repurchase variable instead of dividends. 
We do not obtain significant results, which might be due to the low coverage we have for the stock repurchase data available for Sweden. 
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4.2. Co-purchasers and dividend policy given common owner’s characteristics 
We investigate if this positive relation between future firm dividends and PortDIV varies across the co-purchasers. In Table 3, 
Columns 1–2, we show that only the co-purchasers that are financial institutions impose their “style” for dividends in the newly- 
invested companies. Next, in Columns 3–4 we split our sample into high- and low-turnover co-owners, and we observe that the co-
efficient of PortDIV is positive and significant only in the sub-sample of high-turnover co-owners, consistent with (Gaspar et al., 2012). 
In Columns 5–6 we show that co-purchasers are better able to implement their dividend style in firms that are in sectors in which 
the co-purchaser has expertise. Finally, in Columns 7–8 we split the sample based on co-purchasers’ portfolio size measured with the 
number of stocks in the co-purchaser’s portfolio before the new purchase and run our main regression specification.5 We find that co- 
purchasers with larger portfolios are better able to exert their dividend strategies in their newly invested firms, consistent with credible 
exit threat (Edmans and Manso, 2011). 
Table 2 
Co-purchasers and dividend policy.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV_E        
PortDIV 0.11**   0.11** 0.13**   
(2.62)   (2.36) (2.60)  
PortDIVHigh  0.27** 0.33**      
(2.62) (2.15)    
Copshares   0.16       
(0.08)    
PortDIVHigh * Copshares   − 1.10       
(− 0.45)    
PortDIV_E      0.08**       
(2.16) 
HH Ownership 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.83 20.65***  
(0.49) (0.59) (0.57) (0.52) (1.28) (4.12) 
DIV 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.45***   
(11.43) (11.61) (11.56) (9.41) (7.31)  
ROA 1.09*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 1.09*** 0.92*** 20.11***  
(5.11) (5.22) (4.96) (3.08) (2.75) (3.90) 
RD − 1.09*** − 1.09** − 1.10** − 1.09 − 0.72 10.12  
(− 2.64) (− 2.63) (− 2.60) (− 1.52) (− 1.06) (0.81) 
CAPEX 2.71 2.70 2.67 2.71 3.71 16.06  
(1.42) (1.44) (1.43) (1.44) (1.22) (0.75) 
LEV − 0.56** − 0.55* − 0.54* − 0.56 − 0.11 − 5.53  
(− 2.04) (− 1.95) (− 1.97) (− 1.58) (− 0.29) (− 0.99) 
MB 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03  
(0.45) (0.44) (0.41) (0.35) (0.36) (0.14) 
logASSETS 0.06 0.06* 0.06* 0.06 0.09* 1.15**  
(1.66) (1.76) (1.72) (1.54) (1.70) (2.27) 
BS     0.04       
(1.25)  
BI     0.28       
(0.96)  
DIV_E      0.58***       
(18.23) 
Constant − 0.28 − 0.20 − 0.17 − 0.28 − 0.91 − 15.36  
(− 0.50) (− 0.36) (− 0.30) (− 0.44) (− 1.04) (− 1.40)        
Observations 942 942 942 942 530 893 
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.53 
Cluster Owner Owner Owner Firm Owner Owner 
Regressions are at a co-purchase level. Dependent variable, FDIV (FDIV_E) is firm’s dividend yield (a ratio of dividend to net income) in year t + 1. 
PortDIV (PortDIV_E) is the weighted average dividend yield (a ratio of dividend to net income) in the portfolio of the co-purchaser one year before the 
new purchase (t-1). PortDIVHigh is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if an average stock in co-owners’ portfolio of stocks pays above year- 
median dividend yield, and 0 if otherwise (in year t-1). Copshares is the total fraction of shares co-purchased in the new firm. All the control vari-
ables are measured in year t and defined in the Appendix. All regressions include year and sector fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at 
owner level (Columns 1–3, 5–6) and firm level (Column 4). T-statistics are in parentheses. 
5 Results hold when we use ‘portfolio value’ instead of number of shares as proxy for portfolio size. 
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4.3. Co-purchasers and dividend policy in different governance settings 
In this section, we investigate whether co-purchasers’ ability to influence the dividend policy depends on the newly co-purchased 
firm’s governance setting prior to the co-purchase. Specifically, in Columns 1–2 of Table 4 we show that the positive relation between 
PortDIV and future firm dividends holds only in firms with a low level of institutional ownership concentration, consistent with 
Ferreira and Matos (2008). Columns 3–4 show that co-purchasers impose their dividend strategies in firms with high heterogeneity 
among different identity blocks, consistent with Volkova (2018). In Columns 5–8 we show that our main relation is stronger when the 
largest owner is not a large (family) owner, as agency costs are expected to be higher in firms with no large (family) owners (Edmans 
and Holderness, 2017; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Hence, our results are in line with the notion that large (family) owners are powerful 
and tend to limit institutional investors’ initiatives to change dividend policies. Finally, Columns 9–10 show that co-purchasers are 
better able to implement their strategy on dividends in their newly bought firm where the largest shareholder is not the CEO.6 Overall, 
the results in Table 4 suggest that co-purchasers can be more influential regarding their dividend strategies in firms where agency costs 
are high. 
Table 3 
Dividend policy and co-purchaser’s identity and portfolio turnover.   
Co-purchaser Portfolio turnover Expertise # of stocks in portfolio  
Fin nonFin Low High Yes No Many Few  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV          
PortDIV 0.12** 0.05 0.05 0.20** 0.18*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.05  
(2.57) (0.37) (0.78) (2.30) (3.12) (0.22) (3.68) (1.00) 
TurnoverOthers   0.05 0.15*        
(0.47) (1.90)              
Observations 842 100 450 451 716 226 513 528 
R-squared 0.56 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.63 0.57 0.58 
Regressions are at a co-purchase level. Dependent variable, FDIV is firm’s dividend yield in year t + 1. PortDIV is the weighted average dividend 
(yield) in the portfolio of the co-purchaser one year before the new purchase (t-1). All the independent variables are defined in year t. TurnoverOthers 
is the average turnover of other common owners in a co-purchased firm. All regressions include but the table does not report the following controls 
that are defined in the Appendix: HH Ownership, DIV, ROA, RD, CAPEX, LEV, MB, logASSETS. We split our sample to subsamples depending on 
whether the co-purchaser is a financial firm (Columns 1–2); the co-purchaser’s portfolio turnover is low (Columns 3–4); the co-purchaser owns at least 
one other firm in the same sector (Columns 5–6); the number of stocks in the co-purchaser’s portfolio is many (Columns 7–8). All regressions include 
year and sector fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at owner level. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Table 4 
Co-owners’ Influence in different governance settings.   
HH ownership Ownership identity diversity Largest owner’s fraction of votes Largest owners’ identity Largest owner is CEO  
High Low High Low High Low FamInd nonFamInd Yes No  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV            
PortDIV 0.02 0.16** 0.15** 0.09 0.03 0.16** 0.06 0.16* 0.03 0.09**  
(0.41) (2.50) (2.06) (1.35) (0.49) (2.41) (1.15) (1.86) (0.28) (2.13)            
Observations 476 466 375 365 468 474 625 317 104 794 
R-squared 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.78 0.57 
Regressions are at a co-purchase level. Dependent variable, FDIV is firm’s dividend yield in year t + 1. PortDIV is the weighted average dividend 
(yield) in the portfolio of the co-purchaser one year before the new purchase (t-1). All the independent variables are defined in year t. All regressions 
include but the table does not report the following controls that are defined in the Appendix: HH Ownership (except in Columns 1–2), DIV, ROA, RD, 
CAPEX, LEV, MB, logASSETS. We split our sample to subsamples depending on whether the ownership concentration is high (Columns 1–2); 
ownership identity diversity is high (Columns 3–4); the largest owner has many votes (Columns 5–6); the owner is a family (group) or individuals 
(Columns 7–8); the largest owner is the CEO (Columns 9–10). All regressions include year and sector fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at 
owner level. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
6 We obtain similar results when we consider the founder at the place of the CEO. 
A.D. Giuli et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Finance Research Letters 40 (2021) 101779
6
5. Endogeneity 
Do co-owners purchase firms with similar dividend strategies? Or do they purchase firms with different dividend strategies, 
subsequently rendering them similar to their own dividend style? To mitigate such endogeneity concerns, we implement several tests. 
First, we examine whether a firm’s past dividend yield determines co-purchasing activities. In Panel A of Table 5, we show that past 
firm dividends are unable to explain any of the following proxies of a co-purchase: 1) the probability of being co-purchased (Column 1); 
2) the probability of being co-purchased by an institutional investor (Column 2); 3) the probability of being co-purchased by an 
institutional investor who holds high dividing paying firms in their portfolio prior to the co-purchase (Column 3). The estimates in 
Panel A of Table 5 suggest that co-owners are unlikely to purchase firms with similar dividend strategies. 
Second, future co-owners may be able to forecast the potential for a change in firms’ dividends and buy shares of those firms. 
Specifically, we speculate that future co-owners may base their investment strategies not on current but predicted dividends, and they 
will base their predictions of future dividends on public information. We examine whether the predicted firm dividend yield is related to 
the co-purchases. We regress the dividend on all our controls in Eq. (1) at time t and save the fitted values, DivPr. Those values should 
capture the common trend in dividends, which could be forecasted by managers. In Table 5, Panel B, we use the same model as in Panel 
A, but replace the lagged dividend with the fitted ones, DivPr. The results show that predicted dividend yield does not explain any of the 
proxies of a co-purchase. Lastly, we investigate our main relation for dividend payers versus non-dividend payers. In Table 6 we show 
that that our dividend “style” effect is significant in both dividend and non-dividend payers. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the common ownership literature. We find that firms’ dividend yield is positively related in the new and 
the existing firms in a common owner’s portfolio. This relationship is significant mainly when the co-owner is a financial institution. 
We also show that co-owners’ portfolio characteristics and governance of the newly-invested firm are important in the implementation 
of the dividend strategies of the co-owner. 
Our findings are particularly relevant for non-financial informed investors willing to invest in a firm controlled by common owners. 
These investors should consider that common owners have a dividend style and such firms may not provide a good diversification 
strategy in terms of dividends. When picking firms for their portfolios, investors should take into account the existence of common 
Table 5 
Firm level determinants of co-purchase.   
(1) (2) (3)  
Copurchase CopurchaseFin CopFinHDIV 
Panel A        
LDIV − 0.69 − 0.53 0.39  
(− 0.97) (− 0.76) (0.59) 
Constant 0.52 0.49 0.10  
(1.31) (1.29) (0.29)     
Observations 1806 1806 1806 
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Panel B    
DivPr 0.01 0.01 0.00  
(0.40) (0.78) (0.27)     
Observations 1517 1517 1509 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Regressions are at a firm-year level. Dependent variables are defined at year t, and explanatory ones at year t-1. Co-purchase is a 
dummy variable taking value of 1 if the firm is newly co-purchased by at least one co-owner (common owner being a large owner, 
that is among the top five owners, investing in at least two firms), and 0 if otherwise; Co-purchaseFin is a dummy variable taking value 
of 1 if the new co-purchase is done by a financial institution; CopFinHDIV is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the new co- 
purchase is done by a financial institution that holds high dividend-paying firms in its portfolio one year prior to the purchase; LDIV is 
firm’s dividend yield. DivPr (in panel B) is the firm’s predicted dividend yield, i.e., the fitted value of a regression of DIV (dividend 
yield) on concurrent controls: HH, ROA, RD, CAPEX, LEV, MB, logASSETS, industry and year dummies. All regressions include but the 
table does not report the following controls that are defined in the Appendix: HH Ownership, DIV, ROA, RD, CAPEX, LEV, MB, 
logASSETS. All regressions in Panels A and B include firm fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at firm level. T-statistics 
are in parentheses. 
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owners. Moreover, our findings define settings in which investors can be more influential in the firm’s dividend policy and may be 
relevant for prospective common owners ‘with an agenda’. 
Supplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.frl.2020.101779. 
Appendix 
A1. Definition of variables 
.   
Variables of interest Definition Mnemonics (Data source) 
Co-purchase Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the firm is newly co-purchased by at least one co-owner 
(common owner being a large owner, that is among the top five owners, investing in at least two 
firms), and 0 if otherwise. 
Ägare; Kapital (Modular) 
PortDIV Weighted average dividend (yield) in the portfolio of the co-purchaser one year before the new 
purchase. 
Ägare; Kapital (Modular) &DY 
(Datastream) 
PortDIVHigh Dummy variable taking value of 1 if an average stock in co-owners’ portfolio of stocks pays above 
year-median dividend yield, and 0 if otherwise. 
Ägare; Kapital (Modular) &DY 
(Datastream) 
Copshares Total fraction of shares co-purchased in the new firm. Ägare; Kapital (Modular) 
Co-purchaseFin Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the new co-purchase is done by a financial institution, and 0 if 
otherwise. 
Ägare; Kapital (Modular) 
CopFinHDIV Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the new co-purchase is done by a financial institution that holds 
high dividend-paying firms in its portfolio one year prior to the purchase, and 0 if otherwise. 
Ägare; Kapital (Modular) &DY 
(Datastream) 
Other ownership 
Characteristics   
HH Ownership Sum of the squared ratios of the top five institutional investors’ holdings over total ownership. Ägare; Röster (Modular) 
Fraction of votes % of votes held by the owner. Ägare; Röster (Modular) 
Identity Dummy variables created to represent the identity of the owner. It takes value of 1 if the owner is: a) 




One minus the sum of squared ratios of the different identity’s shares over total firm shares. Ägare; Kapital (Modular) 
Largest Owner CEO Dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest owner is the CEO. Ägare; Kapital (Modular & 
annual reports) 
# of stock in portfolio Total number of stocks in the portfolio of the co-purchaser. Ägare; Kapital; # (Modular) 
Portfolio Turnover Following Gaspar et al. (2012), we define the annual portfolio turnover as the ratio of purchases and 
sales over one year in SEK normalized by SEK value of the portfolio by excluding the co-purchased 
firm. 
Ägare; Kapital (Modular) 
TurnoverOthers Average turnover of other common owners in a co-purchased firm. Ägare; Kapital (Modular) 
Expertise Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if a co-purchaser owns at least one other firm in the same 
sector, and 0 if otherwise. 
Ägare; Kapital (Modular) & 
Sector (Modular) 
Control Variables Definition Mnemonics (Data source) 
DIV Dividend yield which is dividend per share as a percentage of the share price. DY (Datastream) 
(continued on next page) 
Table 6 
Co-purchasers and dividend policy in dividend payers vs. non-payers.   
Dividend Payers Non-dividend Payers  
(1) (2)  
FDIV FDIV    
PortDIV 0.11** 0.13**  
(2.01) (2.29)    
Observations 595 350 
R-squared 0.32 0.25 
Regressions are at a co-purchase level. Dependent variable, FDIV is firm’s dividend yield in year t + 1. 
PortDIV is the weighted average dividend (yield) in the portfolio of the co-purchaser one year before the 
new purchase (t-1). All the independent variables are defined in year t. All regressions include but the 
table does not report the following controls that are defined in the Appendix: HH Ownership, DIV, ROA, 
RD, CAPEX, LEV, MB, logASSETS. We split our sample into subsamples based on whether the firm is 
paying (Column 1) or not paying (Column 2) dividends in year t-1. All regressions include year and 
sector fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at owner level. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
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(continued ) 
Variables of interest Definition Mnemonics (Data source) 
ROA Return on Assets is calculated as net income over total assets. WC01751/ WC02999 
(Datastream) 
RD Research and development expenses over total assets. WC01201 (Datastream) 
CAPEX Capital expenditures over total assets. WC04601 (Datastream) 
LEV Total liabilities over total assets. WC03351/ WC02999 
(Datastream) 
MB Market-to-book ratio. MTBV & MV/ WC02999 
(Datastream) 
ASSETS Natural logarithm of total assets. WC02999 (Datastream) 
BS Number of total directors that serve on the firm boards. Director Count Totals 
(Boardex) 
BI Fraction of independent directors that serve on the firm boards. Director Count Totals 
(Boardex) 
This table presents the definitions of all variables used in this study. 
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